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Abstract
Applications of the maximin criterion extend beyond economics to statistics, computer sci-
ence, politics, and operations research. However, the maximin criterion—be it von Neumann’s,
Wald’s, or Rawls’—draws fierce criticism due to its extremely pessimistic stance. I propose a
novel concept, dubbed the optimin criterion, which is based on (Pareto) optimizing the worst-
case payoffs of tacit agreements. The optimin criterion generalizes and unifies results in various
fields: It not only coincides with (i) Wald’s statistical decision-making criterion when Nature
is antagonistic, (ii) the core in cooperative games when the core is nonempty, though it exists
even if the core is empty, but it also generalizes (iii) Nash equilibrium in n-person constant-
sum games, (iv) stable matchings in matching models, and (v) competitive equilibrium in the
Arrow-Debreu economy. Moreover, every Nash equilibrium satisfies the optimin criterion in an
auxiliary game.
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1 Introduction and motivating examples
The maximin criterion is perhaps one of the few economic concepts that has wide-ranging
applications in fields outside of economics, including computer science, decision sciences,
operations research, philosophy, political science, and statistics. However, not only does
the maximin criterion—be it von Neumann’s, Wald’s, or Rawls’—draw fierce criticism
due to its extremely pessimistic stance, it also fails to perform well in predicting behavior
in the non-zero-sum situations in which most economic and social interactions take place.
In this paper, I propose a novel concept that I dub the optimin criterion, which
builds on the maximin criterion. This paper contributes primarily to the literature on
noncooperative solution concepts. Although the optimin criterion, which I formally define
in the following page, is mainly devised for noncooperative games, it generalizes and unifies
results in various fields. The optimin criterion coincides with (i) von Neumann’s minimax
equilibria in zero-sum games and Wald’s statistical decision-making criterion when Nature
is antagonistic, and (ii) the core in cooperative games when the core is nonempty, though
it exists even if the core is empty. In addition, the optimin criterion generalizes (iii) Nash
equilibria in n-person constant-sum games, (iv) stable matching in matching models, and
(v) competitive economic equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu economy. Moreover, every
Nash equilibrium satisfies the optimin criterion in an auxiliary game. Finally, when
restricted to pure strategies, an optimin point always exists in finite games. Finally,
the optimin criterion is consistent with the direction of non-Nash deviations in games in
which cooperation has been extensively studied, including the finitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemma, the centipede game, the traveler’s dilemma, and the finitely repeated public
goods game.
The maximin approach makes perfect sense in zero-sum games, for which von Neu-
mann (1928) first proved his renowned minimax theorem. A maximin strategist chooses
an action to maximize the minimum utility the player might receive under any conceiv-
able deviation by the other player, “even assuming that his opponent is guided by the
desire to inflict a loss rather than to achieve a gain” (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944, p. 555). As is the case under strategic games, the maximin criterion is extremely
pessimistic as a decision-making rule. For example, Rawls (1971) proposed the so-called
maximin criterion, which prescribes maximizing the situation of the worst-off individuals,
no matter how costly it is for society. Rawls proposed a thought experiment in which peo-
ple in the “original position” choose the principles of social and political justice “behind
the veil of ignorance,” that is, under complete uncertainty about our position in society,
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in order to reach fair agreements (or social contracts). His proposal contributes to the
contractarian or social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, replacing it with
a “hypothetical contract” agreed upon behind the veil of ignorance.
Under the optimin criterion, players act cautiously under a hypothetical contract or
an agreement that their behavior satisfies some “reasonable” rationality assumptions.
For illustrative purposes, I define reasonable behavior as follows: Players do not harm
themselves for the sake of harming others.1 Accordingly, in n-person games, an optimin
point is an agreement in which cautious players (Pareto) optimize their worst-case payoffs
under a hypothetical contract.
Motivation: Why might the maximin criterion be implausible in games? Con-
sider the following 2ˆ2 game in which the unique Nash equilibrium predicts the outcome
to be (U, L). However, the maximin strategy of player 1 (she) is D because it guarantees
a payoff of 1, irrespective of her opponent’s choice, whereas U guarantees only 0 because
player 2 (he) may choose R.
L R
U 2, 2 0, 1
D 1, 2 1, 1
But playing R is not plausible for player 2. Put differently, player 2 must necessarily
harm himself (e.g., by ‘shooting himself in the leg’) to minimize player 1’s utility when
player 1 plays U. This example shows that we need to reconsider the maximin criterion
in non-zero-sum games. Just like the Nash equilibrium, the optimin criterion singles out
(U, L) as the unique solution in this game, albeit for a different reason. I next formally
define the optimin criterion.
Formal definition: Let p∆Xi, uiqiPN be an n-person noncooperative game in mixed
extension and p P ∆X be a strategy profile. An agreement p¯ is said to satisfy the
optimin criterion, or called an optimin point, if p¯ is Pareto optimal with respect to
value function v : ∆X Ñ Rn, whose i’th component, i P N , is defined as vippq “
mintuippq, infp1´iPB´ippq uippi, p
1
´iqu, where Bippq “ tp
1
i P ∆Xi|uipp
1
i, p´iq ą uippi, p´iqu is
the better-response correspondence and B´ippq “
Ś
jPNztiupBjppq Y tpjuq. Equivalently,
in the primitives of the game, p¯ solves the following multi-objective optimization problem.
p¯ P arg max
pˆP∆X
ˆ
inf
p1´1PB´1ppˆq
u1ppˆ1, p
1
´1q, inf
p1´2PB´2ppˆq
u2ppˆ2, p
1
´2q, . . . , inf
p1´nPB´nppˆq
unppˆn, p
1
´nq
˙
.
1Because I make this definition over the utility function, even “sadists” are covered by the definition.
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Intuition: Suppose that before playing a game players can make a tacit agreement to
play a strategy profile p P ∆X . Because the agreement is nonbinding, each player has the
option of either honoring or breaking the agreement. The optimin criterion, which is based
on two steps, identifies potential agreements that players can cautiously enter into. First,
player i’s value vippq (i.e., the worst-case payoff) of following a tacit agreement p is defined
as the minimum utility the player receives (i) from the agreement, or (ii) under the other
players’ unilateral profitable deviations from the agreement, which rules out implausible
deviations. Second, the worst-case payoffs of players are Pareto optimized. The rationale
behind this is the assumption that players each evaluate a potential agreement by its
worst-case payoffs and would rather agree on profile p than p1 if the worst-case payoffs
at agreement p are greater than or equal to the worst-case payoffs at p1—in other words,
p Pareto dominates p1. Accordingly, an agreement satisfies the optimin criterion if it is
not possible to increase a player’s worst-case payoff without decreasing any other player’s
worst-case payoff.
Illustrative example: To illustrate the optimin criterion, consider the game in Figure 1
(left) in which attention is restricted to pure strategies for simplicity. The maximin
strategy concept does not have a predictive power in this game because every action is a
maximin strategy, guaranteeing a payoff of 0. Consider a tacit agreement to play (Top,
Left). Even if player 2 (he) has a profitable deviation to ‘Center’, player 1 (she), who
follows her part of the agreement, would still receive 100 at profile (Top, Center). True,
player 2 could also deviate to ‘Right’—a viable deviation under the maximin strategy
concept—but this would be implausible because he must inflict a huge loss on himself by
doing so. Thus, the worst-case payoff or the “value” associated with (Top, Left) is 100
for each player whether (i) the opponent honors the tacit agreement, or (ii) betrays the
agreement by making a unilateral profitable deviation. To give another example, consider
a potential agreement on (Middle, Center), which also seems attractive. The minimum or
worst-case payoff associated with this agreement is 0 for player 1 because player 2 could
profitably deviate to ‘Right’, in which case player 1, who honors the agreement, would
receive 0 (and vice versa).2 It turns out that (Top, Left) is the unique optimin point
because it (Pareto) optimizes the worst-case payoffs illustrated in Figure 1 (right).
The profile (Top, Left) can be justified as a solution as follows. Suppose that before the
game, players set up a binding contract in which, if they agree to play a particular strategy
profile, no one will deviate from it in a nonprofitable manner. After the agreement has
2For the calculation of worst-case payoffs in each case, see section 3.
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Left Center Right
Top 100, 100 100, 105 0, 0
Middle 105, 100 95, 95 0, 210
Bottom 0, 0 210, 0 5, 5
Left Center Right
Top p100, 100q p100, 0q p0, 0q
Middle p0, 100q p0, 0q p0, 5q
Bottom p0, 0q p5, 0q p5, 5q
Figure 1: An illustrative game (left) and its worst-case payoffs (right). The unique optimin
point is the agreement (Top, Left), whereas every strategy is a maximin strategy in this
game. The unique Nash equilibrium is (Bottom, Right).
been made, they will make their choices simultaneously and independently. Under this
contract, notice that a player may still make a unilateral profitable deviation from (Top,
Left), and therefore this cannot be an equilibrium solution; however, by sticking to the
agreement, a player actually guarantees 100—the highest amount that can be guaranteed
in the game. If cautious players have the option of agreeing to this contract, then they
clearly have incentives to do so—the amount they can guarantee increases from 0 to 100.
Moreover, if they can reach this agreement under a formal contract, then they can also
reach the same agreement through a hypothetical contract or tacit agreement under which
everyone observes the following simple rule: Do not harm yourself for the sake of harming
the other. Players may imagine that they are in the “original position” (just as in Rawls,
1971) and reach the agreement via a thought experiment. This would rationalize (Top,
Left) as the unique solution that guarantees the highest payoffs under such a hypothetical
contract.
Cooperative games: The optimin criterion can also be applied to cooperative games in
characteristic function form. When the core is nonempty, an allocation is in the core if and
only if it satisfies the optimin criterion. But as I show in subsection 4.1.1, optimin points
exist even when the core is empty. As an example, consider the following cooperative
game in characteristic function form in which N “ t1, 2, 3u, upt1uq “ 35, upt2uq “ 30,
upt3uq “ 25, upt1, 2uq “ 90, upt1, 3uq “ 80, upt2, 3uq “ 70, and upNq “ 110, where upSq
denotes the worth of coalition S. The core of this game is empty, whereas the points that
satisfy the optimin criterion can be characterized by the following set, which is illustrated
in Figure 2.3
tx P R3|x1 “ 40, x2 ` x3 “ 70, x2 ě 30, x3 ě 25u.
The Shapley value is p44.166, 36.666, 29.166q, and the nucleolus is p46.666, 36.666, 26.666q.
Notice that at each of these solutions, player 2 and player 3 can profitably break away
3For the formal definition and calculations, see subsection 4.1.1.
5
p110, 0, 0q p0, 110, 0q
p0, 0, 110q
p40, 30, 40q
p40, 45, 25q
p44, 37, 29q
Sh. V.
Figure 2: A game with an empty core. The set of optimin points is shown by the dashed
line.
from the grand coalition to receive a joint payoff of 70.4 As a result, the worst-case payoff
of player 1 would be equal to her individual payoff, upt1uq “ 35, under both the Shapley
value and the nucleolus. Notably, under the optimin criterion, player 1 receives less than
both the Shapley value and the nucleolus. But this is compensated for by the fact that
coalition t2, 3u does not have any incentive to deviate from an optimin point, so player
1 can safely enjoy the (worst-case) payoff of 40 as opposed to the worst-case payoff of 35
under the Shapley value or the nucleolus.
The Arrow critique: Arrow (1973) strongly disagrees with Rawls’ maximin principle,
mainly from a welfare economics perspective. He draws attention to the first funda-
mental theorem of welfare economics, which asserts that under some mild conditions,
every competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal, given that all economic agents are ratio-
nal (i.e., maximize individual utilities). Clearly, in a competitive economic system such
as an Arrow-Debreu economy, the maximin criterion would not lead to the competitive
equilibrium. By contrast, I will show in subsection 4.2 that every competitive economic
equilibrium must satisfy the optimin principle. This result is nontrivial, in part because
optimin points are logically distinct from the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality.
4This is not surprising because the Shapley value is generally regarded as an a priori assessment of
the game.
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2 Relevant literature
This paper contributes mainly to the literature on noncooperative solution concepts with a
view to explaining the puzzling cooperative behavior in noncooperative games. The closest
concept to the optimin criterion, as I have discussed, is that of the maximin criterion,
which has been proposed in different contexts by a number of researchers, including
Borel (1921), von Neumann (1928), Wald (1950), and Rawls (1971). There are also
axiomatizations of the maximin criterion proposed by including Milnor (1954) and Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989). In their seminal work, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) show that
maxmin expected utility can be characterized by a set of intuitive axioms for cautious
decision makers with a set C of (multi-prior) subjective beliefs. Just like one can vary C
in the Gilboa-Schmeidler maxmin model and rationalize different choices, one can vary
the interdependent constraint Bi in the optimin model and rationalize different choices in
an interactive setting. For another related axiomatization, see Puppe and Schlag (2009),
who show that the axioms of Milnor (1954) that characterize the maximin decision rule
are consistent with ignoring some states in which all payoffs are “small.” Under reasonable
conditions, optimin criterion coincides with Wald’s maximin criterion and the maxmin
expected utility. In more general strategic and nonstrategic contexts, the optimin criterion
is yet to be axiomatized. The literature on solution concepts which incorporates various
levels of cautiousness in games includes Selten (1975) and more recently Perea et al.
(2006), Renou and Schlag (2010), and Iskakov et al. (2018). Prominent equilibrium
concepts under ambiguity include Dow and Werlang (1994), Lo (1996), Klibanoff (1996),
Marinacci (2000), and more recently Azrieli and Teper (2011), Bade (2011), Riedel and
Sass (2014), and Battigalli et al. (2015). For an overview of the ambiguity models in
games, see Mukerji and Tallon (2004) and Beaucheˆne (2014).
The optimin criterion differs from the aforementioned models and solution concepts
in three main dimensions: (i) Conceptual/cognitive background, (ii) scope of applica-
tion, and (iii) predictions. First, the optimin criterion is a non-equilibrium concept in
which players evaluate tacit agreements by their worst-case payoffs. As such, it provides
a novel extension of maximin reasoning from two-person zero-sum games to non-zero-sum
n-person games. Second, although the optimin criterion is mainly devised for noncoop-
erative games, it can also be applied to cooperative games, matching, individual decision
making, statistical decision theory, and competitive economy. Third, unlike other solution
concepts, the optimin criterion is consistent with the direction of non-Nash deviations in
games in which cooperation has been extensively studied, including the finitely repeated
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prisoner’s dilemma, the centipede game, the traveler’s dilemma, and the finitely repeated
public goods game.
Limitations: All in all, it seems unlikely that human behavior can be captured by a
single reasoning process. For example, the ‘11-21’-type games introduced by Arad and
Rubinstein (2012) seem to naturally invoke level-k reasoning (Stahl, 1993), whereas in
complex games, such as Blotto games, players—who are unable to calculate optimal
strategies—look at the characteristics of strategies rather than the strategies themselves
(for a formalization of this type of reasoning, see Arad and Rubinstein, 2019). Moreover, in
two-person zero-sum games, the optimin criterion does not tell us anything new because
it coincides with the maximin strategies and the Nash equilibrium in those games. It
remains to be seen the extent to which the optimin reasoning can complement other
reasoning processes.
3 Optimin criterion in noncooperative games
3.1 Definitions
Let p∆Xi, uiqiPN be an n-person noncooperative game in mixed extension, where N “
t1, ..., nu is the finite set of players, ∆Xi the set of all probability distributions over the
finite action set Xi, and ui : ∆X Ñ R the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
function of player i P N . An agreement p P ∆X denotes a strategy profile.5
Definition 1. The better-response correspondences Bippq and B´ippq are defined as
Bippq “ tp
1
i P ∆Xi|uipp
1
i, p´iq ą uippi, p´iqu, and B´ippq “
ą
jPNztiu
pBjppq Y tpjuq.
I next define the worst-case payoffs of an agreement p.
Definition 2. Given an agreement p P ∆X and i P N , the i’th component of the (optimin)
value function v : ∆X Ñ Rn is defined as
vippq “ inf
p1´iPB´ippq
uippi, p
1
´iq.
5For a detailed discussion of the mixed-strategy concept, see Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 74). For a
more recent discussion, see Rubinstein (1991). As is standard in game theory, I assume that what matters
is the consequence of strategies (consequentialist approach) so that I can define the utility functions over
the strategy profiles.
In other words, player i’s value from an agreement p is defined as the minimum payoff
the player receives (i) from the agreement, or (ii) under the better-response correspon-
dence of other players. The next step is to make comparisons among the evaluations of
agreements. Because the value function is a multi-variable function, I use a well-known
multi-criteria maximization technique called Pareto-optimality. An agreement is an opti-
min point if its value is Pareto optimal.
Definition 3. An agreement p¯ P ∆X is said to satisfy the optimin criterion or called
an optimin point if for every player i ‰ j with i P N and every p1 P ∆X , vipp
1q ą vipp¯q
implies that there is some j with vjpp
1q ă vjpp¯q. Equivalently, in the primitives of the
game, p¯ solves the following multi-objective optimization problem.
p¯ P arg max
pˆP∆X
ˆ
inf
p1´1PB´1ppˆq
u1ppˆ1, p
1
´1q, inf
p1´2PB´2ppˆq
u2ppˆ2, p
1
´2q, . . . , inf
p1´nPB´nppˆq
unppˆn, p
1
´nq
˙
.
It can be stated more compactly as follows: p¯ P argmaxqP∆X infp1´iPB´ipqq uipqi, p
1
´iq for
every i simultaneously. In Ismail (2014), I called p¯ a ‘maximin equilibrium’ if it is an
optimin point or for every i, p¯i P argmaxqiP∆Xi infp1´iPB´ipqi,p¯´iq uipqi, p
1
´iq, which could be
thought of as the equilibrium counterpart of the optimin.
3.2 The intuition and rationale behind the definitions
First, Definition 1 is a standard way to define the better-response correspondence. Second,
the value function in Definition 2 assigns for each player a unique value or worst-case payoff
to every potential agreement p, which is a profile of strategies. To illustrate the rationale
behind this definition, suppose that before playing a noncooperative game players can
make a tacit (nonbinding) agreement to play a strategy profile p. Then, each player
chooses his or her strategy simultaneously and independently, so each player has the
option of either honoring or breaking the agreement because it is nonbinding. The optimin
value assumes that players evaluate such an agreement cautiously, ruling out implausible
deviations from the agreement—i.e., the deviations which do not strictly improve the
payoff of the deviator, holding the others’ strategies fixed. Accordingly, a player’s value
or worst-case payoff of following a tacit agreement is defined as the minimum utility the
player receives (i) from the agreement, or (ii) under the other players’ unilateral profitable
deviations from the agreement, which is a rough formalization of the following simple rule
I put forward earlier: Do not harm yourself for the sake of harming others.6
6Note that if p is a Nash equilibrium, then Bippq “ H because it is a self-enforcing agreement—each
player best-responds holding the others’ strategies fixed. But when agreement p is not a Nash equilibrium,
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Notably, the value function includes only unilateral and noncooperative deviations—
i.e., coalitional or correlated profitable deviations are not considered, which I consider in
subsection 4.1.1. Instead of better-response deviations, other type of deviations such as
best-response deviations might also be considered. All in all, definitions 1–3 would remain
well-defined if correlated or best-response deviations are included.7
To illustrate the optimin value I return to the illustrative game in Figure 3 (left),
restricting attention to pure strategies for simplicity. Figure 3 (right) shows that the
value of (Top, Left) is (100, 100). This is because even if, for example, player 2 profitably
deviates to ‘Center’, player 1 (who follows the tacit agreement) would still receive a
payoff of 100. Notice that this is the only profitable deviation from agreement (Top,
Left), because a deviation to ‘Right’ would be implausible. To give another example, the
value of (Bottom, Center) is p5, 0q because (i) player 1 has no profitable deviation from it,
and (ii) player 2 may profitably deviate to ‘Right’, in which case player 1 would receive
a payoff of 5. The value or worst-case payoff of (Top, Center) is 100 for player 1 because
player 2 has no profitable deviation from it. By contrast, for player 2 the worst-case payoff
of (Top, Center) is 0 because player 1 can profitably deviate to Bottom, which decreases
player 2’s payoff to 0.
Finally, Definition 3 suggests that the value function or the worst-case payoffs of
players be Pareto optimized. The rationale behind this is the assumption that the greater
the optimin value of an agreement for all players, the higher its likelihood to be (tacitly)
agreed upon. Put differently, players—who each evaluate a potential agreement by its
worst-case payoff—would rather agree on profile p than p1 if the worst-case payoffs at
agreement p are greater than or equal to the worst-case payoffs at p1 (in other words, p
there are profitable deviations from p, in which case the “cost” of such deviations to nondeviators is
measured by the worst-case payoffs under these deviations. Moreover, unlike in maximin strategies, the
(optimin) value function does not assign a unique value to every strategy. Instead, the evaluation of
uncertainty is attached to the strategy profile, as in the value notion of Nash (1951). Nash (1951, p. 291)
defines the value of a game to a player as the payoff that the player receives from a Nash equilibrium
when all of the Nash equilibria payoffs are the same for that player. The optimin value assigns a value to
each agreement, including the Nash equilibria. In particular, when an agreement is a Nash equilibrium,
the value of a player at this profile is equal to her Nash equilibrium payoff because it is self-enforcing.
7The optimin point is an application of the evaluation and comparison method I propose for solving
games. For a more general application, we may interpret Bjppq as being the belief of some player i about
player j’s (or a coalition’s) potential deviations, and apply the evaluation step accordingly. As mentioned
earlier, just like one can vary C in the Gilboa-Schmeidler maxmin model and rationalize different choices,
one can vary Bj and rationalize different choices in a game setting. Maximin strategy corresponds to the
case in which a player’s belief about her opponent’s deviations is the whole strategy set of the opponent.
That is, player i does not take individual rationality of the opponent into account. The optimin principle
can be incorporated with stronger or weaker individual rationality assumptions, even with different ones
for different players, by following the same method we follow in this section.
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Left Center Right
Top 100, 100 100, 105 0, 0
Middle 105, 100 95, 95 0, 210
Bottom 0, 0 210, 0 5, 5
Left Center Right
Top p100, 100q p100, 0q p0, 0q
Middle p0, 100q p0, 0q p0, 5q
Bottom p0, 0q p5, 0q p5, 5q
Figure 3: An illustrative game (left) and its value function (right). The unique optimin
point is the agreement (Top, Left), whereas every strategy is a maximin strategy.
Pareto dominates p1). So, the most likely tacit agreements lie on the Pareto frontier of
the value function.8 In other words, an agreement satisfies the optimin criterion if it is
not possible to increase a player’s worst-case payoff without decreasing another player’s
worst-case payoff.9
To illustrate the optimin criterion, I return to the game and its value function in
Figure 3. Notice that the value function is Pareto optimized at the agreement (Top,
Left), so it is the unique optimin point. To compare this solution with the maximin
strategy and Nash equilibrim, notice that every strategy is a maximin strategy, which
guarantees a payoff of 0, whereas the unique Nash equilibrium is (Bottom, Right).
As mentioned in the introduction, the optimin point (Top, Left) can be justified as a
solution as follows. Suppose that before the game, Alice and Bob set up a binding contract
in which, if they agree to play a particular profile, no one will make a nonprofitable
deviation. After the agreement has been made, they will make their choices simultaneously
and independently. Under the contract, a player may still make a unilateral profitable
deviation from (Top, Left), so it cannot be an equilibrium solution; but by sticking to the
agreement, a player actually guarantees 100—the highest amount that can be guaranteed
in this game. If cautious players have the option of agreeing to this contract, then they
clearly have incentives to do so—the amount they can guarantee increases from 0 to
100. Moreover, if they can reach this agreement under a formal contract, then they can
also reach the same agreement through a hypothetical contract or tacit agreement under
which everyone observes the following simple rule: Do not harm yourself for the sake
of harming the other. As mentioned earlier, players may imagine that they are in the
“original position” and reach the agreement via a thought experiment rather than signing
8Notice that Pareto optimality applies only to the value function of players, not to the utility function.
Furthermore, there is also no logical relationship between Pareto optimality and the optimin point. In
the battle of the sexes game, for example, the two optimin points are (Football, Football) and (Opera,
Opera), which are Pareto optimal. However, the optimin point may be Pareto dominated. In the
prisoner’s dilemma, the unique optimin point is (Defect, Defect), which is Pareto dominated.
9In an earlier version, I also used another maximization principle in the comparison step, namely the
Nash equilibrium, by applying it to the game defined by the value function.
11
a binding contract. This would rationalize (Top, Left) as a solution that guarantees the
highest payoffs under such a hypothetical contract.
3.3 Existence, properties, and applications
The following lemma presents a property of the value function which will be used in the
following existence result.
Lemma 1. The value function of a player is upper semi-continuous.
Proof. In several steps, I will show that the value function vi of player i in a game
Γ “ p∆X1,∆X2, u1, u2q is upper semi-continuous.
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First, we decompose the value function as
vippq “ mint inf
p1jPBjppq
uippi, p
1
jq, uippqu,
where Bjppq is the (strict) better response correspondence of player j with respect to p,
representing the set of profitable deviations, which is defined as
Bjppq “ tp
1
j P ∆Xj |ujppi, p
1
jq ą ujppqu.
I next show that the correspondence Bj : ∆Xiˆ∆Xj ։ ∆Xj is lower hemi-continuous.
For this, it is enough to show the graph of Bj defined as follows is open.
GrpBjq “ tpq, pjq P ∆Xi ˆ∆Xj ˆ∆Xj | pj P Bjpqqu.
GrpBjq is open in ∆Xi ˆ ∆Xj ˆ ∆Xj if and only if its complement is closed. Let
rppj, qi, qjq
ks8k“1 be a sequence in rGrpBjqs
c “ p∆Xi ˆ ∆Xj ˆ ∆XjqzGrpBjq, converg-
ing to ppj, qi, qjq where p
k
j R Bjpq
kq for all k. That is, we have ujpp
k
j , q
k
i q ď ujpq
kq for all k.
Continuity of uj implies that ujppj , qiq ď ujpqq, which means pj R Bjpqq. Hence rGrpBjqs
c
is closed, implying that Bj is lower hemi-continuous.
Next, we define uˆi : ∆Xi ˆ ∆Xj ˆ ∆Xj Ñ R by uˆipqi, qj, pjq “ uippj, qiq for all
pqi, qj, pjq P ∆Xiˆ∆Xj ˆ∆Xj . Since ui is continuous, uˆi is also continuous. In addition,
we define u¯i : GrpBjq Ñ R as the restriction of uˆi to GrpBjq, that is u¯i “ uˆi|GrpBjq. The
continuity of uˆi implies the continuity of its restriction u¯i, which in turn implies u¯i is
upper semi-continuous.
10The extension of the arguments to n-person case is completely analogous as long as n is finite, as is
assumed.
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By Theorem 1 of Berge (1959, p. 115), lower hemi-continuity of Bj and lower semi-
continuity of´u¯i : GrpBjq Ñ R imply that the function ´v¯i : ∆Xiˆ∆Xj Ñ R—defined as
´v¯ipqq “ suppjPBjpqq´u¯ippj , qq—is lower semi-continuous.
11 This implies that the function
v¯ipqq “ infpjPBjpqq u¯ippj, qq is upper semi-continuous.
12
As a result, the value function vipqq “ mintv¯ipqq, uipqqu of player i is upper semi-
continuous because the minimum of two upper semi-continuous functions is also upper
semi-continuous.
The following theorem shows that the optimin point exists in mixed strategies.
Theorem 1. Every mixed extension of a finite game has an optimin point.
Proof. Define vmaxi “ argmaxqP∆Xiˆ∆Xj vipqq, which is a nonempty compact set because
∆Xiˆ∆Xj is compact, and vi is upper semi-continuous by Lemma 1. Since v
max
i is com-
pact and vj is also upper semi-continuous, the set v
max
ij “ argmaxqPvmaxi vjpqq is nonempty
and compact. Clearly, the profiles in vmaxij are Pareto optimal with respect to the value
function, implying that vmaxij is a nonempty compact subset of the set of optimin points
in the game. Analogously, the set vmaxji is also a nonempty compact subset of the set
of optimin points. (Note that these arguments can be applied to games with any finite
number of players.)
Notice that we have used neither the convexity of the strategy sets nor the concavity
of the utility functions in the proof of Lemma 1 or Theorem 1. Thus, the latter result
can be stated more generally as follows: Any game with continuous utility functions and
compact strategy spaces possesses an optimin point.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p. 70) argued that invariance with respect to positive
linear transformations of the utilities is a fundamental requirement for a solution concept.
This requirement is satisfied by the optimin point as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 1. Optimin points are invariant to positive linear transformation of the
utilities.
Proof. Let Γ and Γˆ be two games such that that uˆi “ αui ` β for some α ą 0 and some
constant β. First, we have that vˆi “ αvi`β because strict better response correspondence
does not change, and we can take α and β out of the infimum in the definition of vi.
Second, a profile p is a Pareto optimal profile with respect to v if and only if it is Pareto
11I follow the terminology, especially the definition of upper hemi-continuity, presented in Aliprantis
and Border (1994, p. 569).
12I use the fact that a function f is lower semi-continuous if and only if ´f is upper semi-continuous.
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optimal with respect to vˆ because each vi is a positive linear transformation of vˆi. As a
result, the set of optimin points of Γ and Γˆ are the same.
The following proposition shows that without the individual rationality assumption,
the optimin criterion would coincide with the maximin criterion.
Proposition 2. Suppose that in the definition of the value function B´ippq is replaced
with ∆X´i. Then, the optimin criterion solution reduces to a profile of maximin strategies.
Proof. We take the infimum over ∆X´i instead of taking it over B´ippq in the value
function definition. Hence, we have that v¯ippq “ infp1´iP∆X´i uippi, p
1
´iq. Then, p¯ is a Pareto
dominant profile of the value function v¯ where p¯i P argmaxp1iP∆Xi infp1´iP∆X´i uipp
1
i, p
1
´iq.
It is clear that p¯i is a maximin strategy of player i.
The next proposition shows that the optimin criterion in constant-sum games gener-
alizes the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Every Nash equilibrium in an n-person constant-sum game is an optimin
point.
Proof. The utility vector of a Nash equilibrium is the same as its value because there is no
unilateral profitable deviation from it. In addition, it always holds that vippq ď uippq for
every p and every player i. Because every strategy profile is Pareto optimal in n-person
constant-sum games, the value of a Nash equilibrium must be Pareto optimal. Therefore,
a Nash equilibrium must be an optimin point in any n-person constant-sum game.
For every n-person game, we can define a fictitious pn` 1q-person game in which, all
else being equal, the pn` 1qst player has only one strategy and his or her payoffs are such
that the new game is of constant-sum.
Proposition 4. Every Nash equilibrium in a general n-person game satisfies the optimin
criterion in the pn ` 1q-person fictitious game.
Proof. Note that a Nash equilibrium in an n-person game is also a Nash equilibrium in the
pn`1q-person fictitious game (given the action of the fictitious player). By Proposition 3, a
Nash equilibrium in the fictitious game must be an optimin point because it is a constant-
sum game.
The following proposition shows the existence of an optimin point in pure strategies
when the game is restricted to pure strategies.
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Proposition 5. Every finite game restricted to pure strategies has an optimin point in
pure strategies.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward because there are finitely many pure
strategies in finite games, so a Pareto optimal point of the value function exists, which
corresponds to an optimin point of the original game. This proposition is useful in part
because it guarantees the existence of pure optimin points when attention is restricted to
pure strategies, as finding mixed strategy equilibria can be tedious in many games.
3.3.1 Applications: Explaining non-Nash deviations towards cooperation in
non-cooperative games
Cooperation among individuals has been the subject of many experimental investigations
in economics and other (social) sciences. A well-established and systematic finding is that
individuals are more cooperative than the Nash equilibrium suggests. This is puzzling,
especially because players earn more payoffs by cooperating than they would by playing
noncooperative equilibrium. Another consistent finding is that we cannot disregard “self-
ish” noncooperative behavior because, while for some economically relevant parameters
in a given game the play converges towards cooperation, for some other parameters the
play converges to strictly noncooperative (equilibrium-like) behavior.
Most common games in which cooperation has been studied include the finitely re-
peated prisoner’s dilemma, the traveler’s dilemma, the centipede game, and the finitely
repeated public goods game. The optimin criterion can selectively explain the direction
of non-Nash deviations in these games. It is selective in the sense that when cooperation
satisfies the optimin criterion—i.e., when the worst-case payoffs under cooperation are
greater than under defection—noncooperative behavior typically does not satisfy it, and
vice versa.
The predictions and applications of the optimin criterion in well-studied non-cooperative
games have been presented in a companion “applications” paper to ensure that the cur-
rent paper does not become excessively lengthy. Below, I give a non-technical summary
of the optimin predictions in well-known economic games, which is self-contained and
accesible to anyone who is familiar with those games.13
The traveler’s dilemma is a two-person game (illustrated in Figure 4) in which each
player picks a number between 2 and 100; the one who chooses the smaller number, n,
receives n plus a reward r ą 1, and the other receives n minus r; if they both choose n,
13For the technical details of the derivations, please see https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.00211.
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100 99 ¨ ¨ ¨ 3 2
100 100, 100 99´ r, 100` r ¨ ¨ ¨ 3´ r, 3` r 2´ r, 2` r
99 100` r, 99´ r 99, 99 ¨ ¨ ¨ 3´ r, 3` r 2´ r, 2` r
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
3 3` r, 3´ r 3` r, 3´ r ¨ ¨ ¨ 3, 3 2´ r, 2` r
2 2` r, 2´ r 2` r, 2´ r ¨ ¨ ¨ 2` r, 2´ r 2, 2
Figure 4: Traveler’s dilemma with reward/punishment parameter r. The unique optimin
point is to play the highest (lowest) number when r is small (big). The unique Nash
equilibrium is to choose the lowest number regardless of r.
then they each receive n (Basu, 1994). Consistent experimental findings show that the
behavior of subjects crucially depends on the reward/punishment parameter: When r is
“small,” as in the original game, the subjects’ behavior converges towards the highest
number, whereas when r is “large,” their behavior converges towards the lowest number.
(See, e.g., Goeree and Holt, 2001, Capra et al., 1999, and Rubinstein, 2007.) The Nash
equilibrium is insensitive to r, which predicts that the lowest number will always be chosen.
By contrast, the optimin point is responsive to r: The unique optimin point coincides
with the Nash equilibrium when r is large, but when r is small, only the highest pair
of numbers satisfies the optimin criterion. The reason is that, as the reward parameter
increases, the worst-case payoffs of cooperation decrease, and at some point, the worst-
case payoffs for the highest number (100) become smaller than the worst-case payoffs for
the lowest number (2).
The centipede game is a two-person extensive-form game of perfect information where
each player can choose to either continue (cooperate) or stop (defect) at each node (Rosen-
thal, 1981). One of the most common and replicated finding is that, on average, subjects
show the most cooperative behavior in increasing-sum centipedes and the most nonco-
operative behavior in constant-sum centipedes. (See, e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992,
Krockow et al., 2016, and the references therein.) Yet, the unique subgame perfect equi-
librium is always choosing to stop at every decision node whether there are gains from
cooperation or not. The optimin criterion can explain the direction of these non-Nash
deviations. The unique optimin point leads to cooperation in increasing-sum centipedes
whenever the number of decision nodes is greater than or equal to four, whereas the
optimin criterion uniquely coincides with the equilibrium prediction in constant-sum cen-
tipedes, suggesting that the player should play stop immediately. Moreover, as the number
of decision nodes increases, the worst-case payoffs between cooperation and defection be-
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come larger in increasing-sum centipedes, but this gap decreases as the number of decision
nodes decreases. Eventually the worst-case payoffs for defection become greater than the
worst-case payoffs for cooperation as the game progresses. This provides an explanation
as to why cooperation may decrease as the game proceeds.
The finitely repeated n-person public goods game is a repeated game in which
players simultaneously choose to contribute something to a public pot in the stage game.
Not contributing anything (i.e., free-riding) is a dominant strategy for every player, but
if everyone contributes (i.e., if they cooperate), then everyone will be better off. Experi-
mental research indicates that cooperation (i) is significantly greater in games with high
marginal per capita return (MPCR) compared to games with low MPCR, (ii) decreases
as the game progresses, (iii) restarts if the finitely repeated game is played again, and (iv)
is magnified by pre-play communication. (See, e.g., Isaac et al., 1984, Lugovskyy et al.,
2017, and the references therein). While the unique subgame perfect equilibrium predicts
0 contribution in every round irrespective of parameters such as MPCR, the optimin
criterion gives an explanation for these experimental findings. Comparative statics on
exogenous parameters of the game shows the following regularities. First, for high (low)
values of MPCR, cooperative (free-riding) behavior satisfies the optimin criterion. Second,
as the game progresses, the worst-case payoffs of free-riding get closer to, and eventually
becomes greater than, the worst-case payoffs of cooperation. But if the finitely repeated
game is played again, the value of cooperation at the beginning of the game is again
greater than the value of free-riding, which can explain the “restart” effect. Finally, pre-
play communication facilitates players agreeing to cooperative behavior—though these
are certainly tacit agreements because they are nonbinding.
The finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma is a well-known two-person repeated game
in which it is a dominant strategy to defect in the stage game. As is well-known, the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium prescribes defection in every round. Experiments
suggest that (i) initial cooperation increases as the number of rounds increases, and (ii)
cooperation decays as the end of the game approaches. (See, e.g., Axelrod, 1980, Embrey
et al., 2017, and the references therein). The optimin criterion gives an explanation for
these regularities. Although in the one-shot game the unique optimin point coincides
with the unique Nash equilibrium, cooperation generally satisfies the optimin criterion
in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma because, even if a player tries to take advantage of
cooperative behavior, the worst-case payoff of the cooperator is greater than the subgame
perfect equilibrium payoff. As the number of rounds increases, the worst-case payoffs of
cooperation increase. However, these worst-case payoffs gradually decrease as the game
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progresses, and they eventually become less than the worst-case payoffs of defection.
4 Applications beyond noncooperative games
4.1 Cooperative games
4.1.1 Games in characteristic function form
In their groundbreaking book, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced coop-
erative games in which the so-called characteristic function assigns a unique number to
each coalition or subset of players. In this section, I assume transferable utility—i.e., the
utility of a coalition can be redistributed among its members. The concepts introduced
in this section can be analogously extended to games with nontransferable utility.
Let pN, uq be an n-person cooperative game in characteristic function form, where
N “ t1, ..., nu is the finite set of players and u : 2N Ñ R with upHq “ 0 is the characteristic
function which is cohesive.14 Notation S Ď N denotes a coalition, pxiqiPS denotes a
payoff allocation for coalition S where x “ px1, x2, ..., xnq P R
N , and xpSq “ ΣiPSxi.
Characteristic function U is called cohesive if u satisfies the following property: upNq ěřK
k“1 upSkq for every partition tS1, ..., SKu of N . This assumption restricts the attention
to games in which the grand coalition N forms.
A vector x P RN is called feasible if xpNq ď upNq. A feasible x P RN is called an
imputation if xi ě uptiuq for all i P N and xpNq “ upNq. The set of all imputations is
denoted by Ipvq. A vector y P RN is said to dominate z P RN via coalition S if for all i P S
and zpSq ă ypSq ď upSq, in which case S has a profitable deviation from z. An allocation
z is dominated by another allocation y if y dominates z. The set of all imputations that
are not dominated by another imputation is called the core, which may be empty.
Definition 4. The value function of a cooperative game pN, uq is a mapping V : X Ñ RN .
For any feasible payoff vector x P X Ă RN , the i’th component of V , Vi : X Ñ R, is
defined as
Vipxq “ mintxi, min
SPD´ipxq
pxi ´
xpNzSq ´ upNzSq
|NzS|
qu,
where D´ipxq “ tS Ď Nztiu | x is dominated via coalition Su—the set of all coalitions
excluding player i that dominate the payoff vector x.
14Note that characteristic function is usually called value function denoted by v in the literature; for a
reference textbook, see, e.g., Peters (2015). To avoid confusion with the value function I define earlier in
this paper, I call the characteristic function utility function denoted by u.
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The value of a payoff distribution x to a player i is the minimum payoff the player
receives between (i) her payoff and (ii) the worst-case utility she would get if coalition S
profitably deviates from x. The intuition is that if x is dominated via S, then player i
looks at her worst-case payoff when coalition S indeed deviates.15
Of course, it is possible, and perhaps desirable, to consider more “clever” profitable
coalitional deviations than we assume when calculating the worst-case payoffs of a dis-
tribution. For example, Harsanyi (1975) criticized the core as it is based on “myopic”
deviations because a deviating coalition does not consider the possibility of another coali-
tion deviating further. Harsanyi’s (1975) observation has led to a large literature on
solution concepts with farsighted individuals. First, it is possibility to define the value or
the worst-case payoff of a player under profitable farsighted deviations rather than just
one-off deviations (For a comprehensive survey and references, see, e.g., Ray and Vohra,
2015). Second, there may be cases in which a payoff distribution, x, is dominated via
some S. Then, the worst-case payoff of player i in that situation would depend on the
worth of nondeviating coalition NzS which includes i, and how this worth is distributed
among players in NzS. Of course, distributing worth of a coalition among its members
defines another game, which may be solved recursively. Third, there may be two different
subsets of Nztiu that have a profitable deviation from x, in which case it would be sensible
to consider only “maximal” or “best-response” deviations—i.e., deviations that give the
largest payoff to a deviating coalition.
While these are all potential research directions, the purpose of this section is to il-
lustrate how “evaluate and compare” method and its specific application, the optimin
criterion, I introduced in this paper can be applied to cooperative games. As before,
the evaluation step gives a value to each payoff distribution based on deviations that are
deemed “reasonable,” and the comparison step makes comparison among these evalua-
tions.
Definition 5. A feasible payoff distribution x P RN is said to satisfy the optimin criterion
or called an optimin point if for every player i ‰ j and every feasible x1 P RN , Vipx
1q ą
Vipxq implies that there is some j with Vjpx
1q ă Vjpxq.
As before, if the value of a feasible payoff vector is Pareto optimal, then it is called an
15For convenience, I defined the worst-case payoff of a player i from some x when a coalition S profitably
deviates from x by minSPD
´ipxqpxi ´
xpNzSq´upNzSq
|NzS| q. The intuition is that if the total utility of the non-
deviating coalition NzS is less than the total payoff this coalition was supposed to receive before the
deviation, then the losses are shared equally. It could be defined more generally—it is sufficient that
when a coalition S profitably deviates from x, it must hold that
ř
iPNzS Vipxq “ upNzSq.
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optimin point.16 I next present two useful results before giving an illustrative example.
Theorem 2. There exists an optimin point in every cooperative game in characteristic
function form.
Proof. We can apply the same steps as in Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 given the following
facts. First, note that the “better-response correspondence”—i.e., the set of dominating
payoff allocations given an allocation—is lower hemi-continuous because it is a finite
set since there are finitely many coalitions. Second, the utility function of players are
continuous because the domain of the function is simply finite. Then, applying the same
steps as in Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 show that the set of optimin points in a cooperative
game is nonempty.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the core is nonempty. Then, a feasible payoff distribution x is
in the core if and only if x is an optimin point.
Proof. Suppose that x is in the core, which is nonempty by assumption. By definition,
there is no individual or coalitional profitable deviation from an element x in the core.
Thus, the value of x is equal to its payoff vector, which is Pareto optimal. As a result,
x is an optimin point. Conversely, to reach a contradiction suppose that x satisfies
the optimin criterion but is not in the core. It implies that there is some coalition S
who has a profitable deviation from x—i.e., xpSq ă upSq. Then, the total value of the
players in the non-deviating coalition NzS must be less than the sum of their payoffs—
i.e.,
ř
jPNzS Vjpxq ď xpNzSq, by definition of the value function. Moreover, cohesiveness
of the characteristic function implies that both the deviating coalition S and the non-
deviating coalition NzS would each receive (and guarantee in terms of value) in total
weakly more payoff in case the grand coalition forms. The last two statements imply thatř
iPN Vipxq ă upNq, which is possible to achieve as the core is nonempty. The difference
pupNq ´
ř
iPN Vipxqq then can be reallocated in a way that makes at least a player better
off without reducing the value of another player. Therefore, x cannot be an optimin point
as is assumed. As a result, we obtain that if x is an optimin point, which we know it
exists by Theorem 2, it must be in the core, which is nonempty by assumption.
Corollary 1. The nucleolus satisfies the optimin criterion whenever the core is nonempty.
Proof. When the core is nonempty the nucleolus is in the core. Thus, by Theorem 3
nucleolus satisfies the optimin criterion.
16One could also define “optimin core” as the core of the cooperative game with respect to the worst-
case payoffs function.
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As Theorem 3 illustrates the set of optimin points is equivalent to the core whenever
the core is nonempty. Corollary 1 shows that when the nucleolus is in the core it satisfies
the optimin criterion. But when the core is empty, this result no longer holds as the
following example illustrates. The game is adapted from Kahan and Rapoport (1984, p.
61) to compare the core, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), the nucleolus (Schmeidler,
1969), and the optimin criterion.
Example: A game with an empty core. Suppose that N “ t1, 2, 3u and upt1uq “ 35,
upt2uq “ 30, upt3uq “ 25, upt1, 2uq “ 90, upt1, 3uq “ 80, upt2, 3uq “ 70, and upNq “ 110.
Solution of the game: First note that the core of this game is empty because x1`x2`
x3 “ 110, x1 ` x2 ě 90, x1 ` x3 ě 80, and x2 ` x3 ě 70 imply that x1 ě 50, x2 ě 40, and
x3 ě 30, which lead to a contradiction. The Shapley value of this game can be calculated
by taking the average of marginal contributions, which is p44.166, 36.666, 29.166q as is
illustrated in Figure 5. The nucleolus of the game is p46.666, 36.666, 26.666q. Next, I
show that the set of points that satisfy the optimin criterion can be characterized by
tx P R3|x1 “ 40, x2 ` x3 “ 70, x2 ě 30, x3 ě 25u.
First, suppose that x is an optimin point with the property that any of the two players
can profitably deviate. Then the value of xi “ uptiuq or less. Suppose that x1 ` x3 “ 80
so that t1, 3u would not deviate, but then 2 would get only 30, which is no greater than
it can get individually. If x1 ` x2 “ 90 so that t1, 2u would not deviate, then x3 “ 20,
which is less than what 3 can get individually. Finally, suppose that x2` x3 “ 70 so that
coalition t2, 3u does not have an incentive to deviate, hence v1pxq “ 40, which is actually
greater than what 1 can get individually (35). The values of 2 and 3 are v2pxq “ 30 and
v3pxq “ 25 because at distribution x “ p40, x2, x3q with x2`x3 “ 70 and x2 ě 30, x3 ě 25
player 1 can profitably form a coaliton with either 2 or 3. As a result, the worst-case
payoff that 2 or 3 can expect is their individual payoff.
To compare the optimin criterion with the Shapley value, notice that every two-player
coalition would like to deviate from the payoff distribution suggested by the Shapley
value.17 For example, t2, 3u would profitably deviate from the Shapley value distribution
and get 70 together, as a result of which 1’s payoff would decrease to 35. Compared
to the Shapley value (44) and the nucleolus (47), player 1’s payoff is lower under the
17This is not surprising because Shapley (1953) himself put it: “... the value is best regarded as an a
priori assessment of the situation, based on either ignorance or disregard of the social organization of the
players.”
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p110, 0, 0q p0, 110, 0q
p0, 0, 110q
p40, 30, 40q
p40, 45, 25q
p44, 37, 29q
Sh. V.
Figure 5: A game with an empty core. The set of optimin points are shown by the dashed
line.
optimin criterion (40) in a way that gives 2 and 3 just enough payoff to prevent them
from deviating (because they receive 70 in total). Thus, having a lower payoff gives player
1 the safety to enjoy the (worst-case) payoff of 40.
Let’s modify Example 7 so that upNq “ 110 ` c with c ą 0, everything else being
equal. As c increases, the set of optimin points follows a pattern similar to before
tx P R3|x1 “ 40` c, x2 ` x3 “ 70, x2 ě 30, x3 ě 25u,
up to c “ 10, in which case the optimin point becomes unique, which is p50, 40, 30q as
is illustrated in Figure 6. This is because if x1 ą 50, then t2, 3u would jointly deviate
from N to receive 70, in which case player 1’s value would decrease to 35. By similar
arguments, one can show that p50, 40, 30q is indeed the unique optimin point. It turns
out that p50, 40, 30q is also the unique element in the core of the game when upNq “ 120,
and the Shapley value is p47.5, 40, 32.5q. When c ą 10, the core gets larger, hence the set
of the optimin points.
4.1.2 Matching markets
Gale and Shapley (1962) published in the American Mathematical Monthly, a paper that
is generally considered to have initiated matching theory. Another remarkable point
about this paper is that it contained almost no explicit mathematics such as formulas. In
this paper, the authors introduced a “two-sided” matching model in which there are two
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p120, 0, 0q p0, 120, 0q
p0, 0, 120q
p50, 40, 30q
Core p47.5, 40, 32.5q
Shapley V.
Figure 6: The core, the nucleolus, and the unique optimin point coincide at p50, 40, 30q
when upNq “ 120. The Shapley value is p47.5, 40, 32.5q.
sets of invididuals (or objects) that need to be paired or matched. Two-sided matching
problems include the marriage market, school choice, medical labor markets; one-sided
matching problems include housing markets and kidney exchange. The literature on
matching markets has grown considerably since the publication of Gale and Shapley
(1962) and another seminal paper by Shapley and Scarf (1974). For related literature,
see the references in surveys, such as Roth and Sotomayor (1992), and So¨nmez and U¨nver
(2011).
Let pA,B, pąiqiPAYBq be a marriage problem where A and B are two disjoint finite
sets, in which each individual i in a set A or B ranks those potential partners in the other
set. For convenience, I assume that there are n individuals in each set and preferences
are strict. Preference of i is captured by ąi, which is over C Ytiu where C is A or B and
i R C. Notation i ąi j means that individual i would not like to marry j.
Matching in a marriage problem is a function, µ : A Y B Ñ A Y B that satisfies the
following properties:
1. µpaq R B implies that µpaq “ a for all a in A;
2. µpbq R A implies that µpbq “ b for all b in B;
3. µpaq “ b if and only if µpbq “ a for all a in A and b in B.
A matching µ is called individually rational if there is no individual i such that i ąi
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µpiq. A matching is called stable if it is individually rational and there are no a P A and
b P B who are not married to each other yet prefer each other to their current partners.
The optimin principle’s application to a matching problem is similar to its application
to cooperative games. Let µ be a matching and I Ă AYB be a group of players in which
each player in I is either single or matched with another partner in I. Then, I is said to
be a profitable deviation from a matching µ if every player in I prefers their new partner
to their current partner. As before, the first step is to evaluate a matching. The value
of a matching µ to an individual i is the worst-case outcome under (i) the matching µ or
(ii) any profitable deviation by an individual or group, I. Let ąvi denote the preferences
of i based on the value of a matching—i.e., if the value of matching µ is greater than
or equal to the value of matching µ1, then µ ľvi µ
1. The second step would be to make
comparisons among the evaluations of various matchings. Accordingly, a matching is said
to satisfy the optimin criterion if its value is Pareto optimal—no individual can improve
his or her worst-case outcome without decreasing someone else’s worst-case outcome.
Definition 6. A matching µ is said to satisfy the optimin criterion if for every player
i ‰ j and every µ1, µ1 ąvi µ implies that there is some j with µ ąvj µ
1.
Proposition 6 shows that every stable matching in the marriage problem is an optimin
point.
Proposition 6. Every stable matching satisfies the optimin criterion.
Proof. Because there is neither a unilateral nor a group profitable deviation from a sta-
ble matching (see, e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1992), each individual’s value of a stable
matching is equal to the matching’s “payoff” to the individual. (This is similar to the
fact that the value of a Nash equilibrium is exactly its payoff vector.) It is left to show
that the value of a stable matching is Pareto optimal, which is true because every stable
matching is Pareto optimal (see, e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2013).
By similar arguments, one could show that the result would extend to college admission
problems (many-to-one matching). However, there are problems such as the roommate
problem, in which the existence of stable matchings is not guaranteed. In such situations,
a matching that satisfies the optimin criterion would always exist as long as there are
finitely many individuals or objects to be matched. I omit this existence proof as it is
essentially the same as the proof of the existence of pure optimin points in strategic games
(Proposition 5).
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Shapley and Scarf (1974) proposed a housing market (one-sided matching) model in
which a set of houses is to be assigned to a set of individuals who have initial endowments.
(For formal model see, e.g., So¨nmez and U¨nver, 2011). Gale’s Top Trading Cycles (TTC)
algorithm gives a rather strong solution to this problem: It chooses unique matching in
the core of the housing market, which is Pareto efficient and individually rational (Roth
and Postlewaite, 1977). Definition of the optimin principle in one-sided matching models
would be similar to its definition in two-sided markets. The aforementioned properties
of the TTC algorithm show that its outcome satisfies the optimin criterion. Moreover,
the outcome of the TTC algorithm turns out to be the unique competitive equilibrium
allocation. Indeed, in the next subsection (4.2), I show that every competitive equilibrium
satisfies the optimin criterion.
4.2 The Arrow critique and Arrow-Debreu economy
Arrow’s (1973) disagreement with Rawls’ maximin principle mainly stems from its pre-
dictions in welfare economics. For example, the first fundamental theorem of welfare eco-
nomics asserts that under some mild conditions every competitive equilibrium is Pareto
optimal provided that economic agents are utility-maximizers. In contrast to the max-
imin principle, I show below that every competitive economic equilibrium must satisfy
the optimin principle.
Arrow and Debreu (1954) define an abstract economy as a game situation in which—
unlike a standard game—the strategy sets of players depend on the strategies chosen
by other players. In an abstract economy, the players are consumers, producers, and
the market participants who choose prices. The strategy set of a player depends on the
choices of the others because players have constraints such as the budget constraint of
consumers, which depend on the price and, in turn, depend on the choices of the players.
Let E “ pYi, ui, FiqiPN be an abstract economy where N denotes the set of players, Yi
the strategy set, ui the utility function, and Fi : Y´i ։ Yi the feasibility correspondence
of player i P N , which gives player i’s set of feasible strategies given the other players’
strategies.
The value function in an abstract economy is defined completely analogous to the value
function in games: For every profile, the value function gives the minimum utility a player
would receive under the other players’ unilateral profitable deviations. The following two
lemmata will be used in the proof of the existence theorem.
Lemma 2. The value function of each player is upper semi-continuous.
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The proof follows essentially the same steps as the proof of Lemma 1, therefore I
do not reproduce it. (Because utility functions are continuous, the strict better reply
correspondences have open graphs, so Berge’s aforementioned theorem applies.)
Lemma 3. The correspondence Fpyq “ ty P Y |yi P Fipy´iq for all iu is compact for all
y.
Proof. We first show that Fpyq is closed where y P Y . Take a sequence yk converging to
y¯ such that such that yk P Fpyq for all k. This implies that yk P GrpFiq “ ty P Y |yi P
Fipy´iu for all i. Since GrpFiq is closed by our supposition and y
k converges to y¯, we have
y¯ P GrpFiq for every i. This implies that y¯ P Fpyq. Thus, Fpyq is compact because it is
a closed subset of a compact set.
The following theorem shows the existence of an optimin point under some topological
assumptions on the primitives of an abstract economy.
Theorem 4. Let E “ pYi, ui, FiqiPN be an abstract economy. If Yi is compact, ui is
continuous, and Fi has a closed graph, then the economy E has an optimin point.
The proof of Theorem 1 can be applied to prove this theorem with an addition that
one maximizes the value function with respect to F (i.e., vmaxi “ argmaxyPFpyq vipyq),
which is shown to be compact for every y by Lemma 3.
Corollary 2. Competitive economic equilibrium satisfies the optimin criterion.
This follows from Theorem 4 and the second fundamental theorem of welfare eco-
nomics: A competitive equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreu model (i.e., a Nash equilibrium
of the abstract economy) is Pareto optimal. Therefore, it is an optimin point. However,
even if a competitive equilibrium does not exist, an optimin point may exist in an abstract
economy by Theorem 4. This is because, I do not assume convexity of strategy sets, quasi-
concavity of utility functions, or continuity and convexity of feasibility correspondences
in this theorem.
Surely, I only show the mere possibility that an optimin point exists when a competitive
equilibrium does not. In addition, I did not say anything about the conditions on consumer
preferences and producer technologies in this case, which I leave for a future project.
4.3 The optimin criterion in decisions
As mentioned in the introduction, the maximin criterion is too pessimistic and may lead
to extreme conclusions which do not coincide with common sense. Harsanyi (1975) argues
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that acting on such pessimism may prevent individuals from performing even daily tasks
such as crossing a street. In the case of providing drugs to the terminally ill patients,
Harsanyi defends a utilitarian solution: Spending resources, for example, on the higher
education of a mathematical genius, is preferred to a treatment that would extend the
life of a terminally ill patient. I believe that such a solution does not conform with the
morals of many people, as it does not sound just or fair. However, in such situations, the
maximin principle has its own problems: It does not address how to effectively allocate
limited resources in a society. As mentioned previously, extra resources can be used more
efficiently by investing in medical R&D and technology, thereby saving even more human
lives in the future.
With this in mind, I next present a rather general definition of the optimin criterion
in nonstrategic decision-making situations. I define a decision problem as an abstract
economy or a generalized game, which a decision maker plays against Nature. This is not
a new approach. Just like Wald’s (1950) statistical decision theory (see subsection 4.4),
I model Nature as a player, though he assumes that Nature is antagonistic—it tries to
minimize the decision maker’s payoffs, whereas in a decision problem as defined below
Nature may or may not be modeled as an antagonist. Given a decision problem, a profile
of acts is said to satisfy the optimin criterion if it is an optimin point of the abstract
economy. Note that this definition is analogous to previous definitions of the optimin
criterion in various contexts. To formalize the concept, let’s fix some notation.
Let D “ p∆Xi, Fi,UiqiPt1,2u denote a decision problem, which is defined as a two-player
abstract economy in which player 1 is called the decision maker (DM), and player 2 is
called Nature. Xi “ tx
1
i , x
2
i , ..., x
m
i u denotes the finite set of pure acts of i P t1, 2u, ∆Xi
the set of all probability distributions over Xi, pi P ∆Xi a mixed act, and p P ∆X1ˆ∆X2
a mixed act profile. Fi : ∆X´i ։ ∆Xi denotes the feasibility correspondence of i P t1, 2u,
which gives i’s set of feasible acts given the other’s acts. Fi is an extension of pure
feasibility correspondence F 1i : X´i ։ Xi, where for all xi P X´i, F
1
i px´iq Ď Xi. The
mixed feasibility correspondence is then defined as follows:
Fipp´iq “ tpi P ∆Xi | @x
k
i P suppppiq, supppp´iq Ď F
1
i px
k
i qu.
Put differently, given the DM’s mixed act, p1, a mixed act of Nature, p2, is feasible if for all
pure acts of Nature, xk2 with k P t1, 2, ..., mu, in the support of p2, DM’s acts in the support
of p1 must be feasible—i.e., supppp1q Ď F
1
1px
k
2q. The feasibility correspondence captures
that Nature’s acts may depend on the DM’s choices, and vice versa. The intuition behind
this is that Nature may pick a different “strategy” (e.g., a state of nature) depending on
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whether the DM goes to work by metro or by bike. Note that I do not assume that the
DM tries to define the states of Nature “perfectly.” Indeed, there may be better (or more
fine grained) ways to define the states of Nature.18 Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility function of i is defined as Ui : Z Ñ R, where Z “ tppi, p´iq P ∆Xi ˆ∆X´i | p´i P
F´ippiqu. If Nature is antagonistic, then U2 “ ´U1.
Definition 7. For of i P t1, 2u, the optimism constraint, OCippq at p is a subset of Fipp´iq:
OCippq “ tp
1
i P Fipp´iq| ´ i deems p
1
i possibleu.
In other words, for a given an act profile, p, the DM is optimistic that Nature’s choice
will be in OC2ppq. This is neither the first model nor the only way to model optimistic
pessimism in decision making situations. For example, Hurwicz (1951) captures optimism
of a DM with a parameter to take a convex combination of the worst and the best outcomes
associated with acts.
The optimism of the DMmay be captured by a hypothetical or written contract, which
may represent the beliefs, moral ideals, or norms of the DM. Because different individuals
and societies have different beliefs, morals, and norms, the optimin criterion based on the
optimism constraint would be responsive to such characteristics. The optimism constraint
assumes that the optimism of the DM may depend on his or her own act. For example,
going to a game at a stadium (or watching a game on television) to support one’s favorite
team may make the DM more optimistic about the outcome of the game—even if there
is no evidence for it.
Definition 8. The i’th component of the value function, V : ∆X Ñ R2, is defined as
Vippq “ inf
p1´iPOC´ippq
Uippi, p
1
´iq.
Put differently, the value of a choice is defined as the minimum utility the decision-
maker would receive under a hypothetical or formal contract, the optimism constraint,
which captures the optimism of the DM. The value function captures the pessimism of
the DM about his or her choice given the OC.
As before, the next step is to make comparisons among the evaluations of acts. The
value function is then optimized by applying Pareto optimality: An act profile satisfies
the optimin criterion if its value is Pareto optimal under the optimism constraint.
18See, e.g., the discussion in section 12 in Gilboa (2009).
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Definition 9. An act, pi, as part of a tacit agreement p is said to satisfy the optimin
criterion in a decision problem, D “ p∆Xi, Fi,UiqiPt1,2u, if p is an optimin point of the
decision problem under the optimism constraint—i.e., the value of p is Pareto optimal.
The decision problem is modeled as an abstract economy played between a decision
maker and Nature. A tacit agreement, p, between the DM and Nature satisfies the optimin
criterion if its value is Pareto optimal. Under this criterion, the DM is optimistically
pessimistic about his or her choice.
As an example, consider a person deciding on a housing mortgage, and suppose that
she has recently achieved tenure at work. In many countries, a tenured employee may still
be fired in some extreme situations. Thus, if she makes a decision based on the maximin
principle, she should not actually buy a house because she might lose her job in the worst-
case scenario. On the other hand, if getting a mortgage makes her more optimistic that
she will work reasonably well and therefore will not be subject to the conditions of being
fired under extreme situations, then the optimin principle would suggest that she buy the
house. In the hypothetical contract she makes with herself, she has a job guarantee under
reasonable situations. She could be optimistic about her job security but pessimistic
about the possibility of promotion. Note that her preferences can be represented by the
maxmin expected utility, which is not a coincidence as I will show in Proposition 7 below.
Posing the problem of spending resources in a society in terms of the optimin principle
gives us a different perspective on the issue: We should (Pareto) optimize the situation of
the worst-off individuals under a reasonable (perhaps hypothetical) social contract—e.g.,
the funding of drug treatments should be sustainable so that everyone who needs them
could be treated without assessing their backgrounds. This hypothetical or written con-
tract could represent the beliefs and moral ideals of the society, through the policymaker,
as well as the sustainability of the funding. In fact, policymakers have already found
a solution in such situations: The UK’s National Health Service provides newly devel-
oped drugs as long as they are “effective” and sustainable, among other considerations,
without making any discrimination based on the social background or race of those who
receives them. The optimin principle seems to justify this simple rule of thumb of the
policymakers in this decision-making situation.
The following proposition illustrates when the optimin criterion preferences can be
represented by the maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989).
Proposition 7. Let D “ p∆Xi, Fi,UiqiPt1,2u be a decision problem and assume that the
following are satisfied. D is a game rather than an abstract economy with an antagonistic
Nature, and for every act profile p “ pp1, p2q,
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1. OC2ppq “ OC2pp
1q for all p1.
2. OC2ppq is convex and closed.
3. Vppq Pareto dominates Vpp1q if and only if V1ppq ą V1pp
1q where p1 P ∆X.
Then, the preferences of the DM over the acts can be represented by the Gilboa-Schmeidler
maxmin expected utility. In addition, if for all x, OC2pxq “ X2, then optimin criterion
(in pure acts) can be axiomatized by Milnor’s (1954) maximin criterion axioms.
If the conditions in Proposition 7 are satisfied, then it is clear that acts of the DM
can be ranked based on the minimum payoff given the unique set of multi-prior beliefs
where set C in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) corresponds to set OC2ppq above. I next
turn to Wald’s statistical decision theory, which has been recently gaining a momentum
as an alternative to hypothesis testing (see, e.g., Manski, 2019).
4.4 Wald’s theory of statistics
Wald’s (1950) theory is based on the idea that a statistician should use a maximin strategy
to minimize the maximum risk in a carefully constructed game against Nature. The
statistician faces a decision problem under uncertainty and assumes that Nature wants
to maximize the risk, which makes the game between the statistician and Nature a zero-
sum game. This approach views statistical decision-making as a game against Nature.
Formally, a statistical game is denoted by a tuple S “ pY1, Y2, u1, u2q where Y1 and Y2
denote the set (which is not necessarily finite) of strategies of the statistician and the
Nature, respectively.
To illustrate, consider the following simplified version of Bulmer’s (1979, p. 416) game.
Suppose that a possibly unfair coin has a probability of either 1{4 or 1{2 of coming up
heads. The task is to choose between (i) p “ 1{4 or (ii) p “ 1{2 upon tossing the coin
once.
What is the “optimal” decision in this problem? Figure 7 illustrates four actions of the
experimenter: (1) never choose p “ 1{4; (2) always choose p “ 1{4; (3) choose p “ 1{4 if
it comes up heads; (4) choose p “ 1{4 if it comes up tails. Nature has two (pure) actions,
(i) p “ 1{4 or (ii) p “ 1{2. Payofs are simply the expected probability of guessing right
in each case.
In this game against Nature, the experimenter’s optimal maximin strategy is to play
p1
5
, 0, 0, 4
5
q and Nature’s optimal strategy is to play p2
5
, 3
5
q. The experimenter’s probability
of guessing it right is 3
5
, which is significantly higher than a random guess. There is no
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Say p “ 1{4 p “ 1{4 p “ 1{2
never 0 1
always 1 0
if it comes up heads 1/4 1/2
if it comes up tails 3/4 1/4
Figure 7: A statistical game against Nature, which picks p “ 1{4 or p “ 1{2.
other strategy that can guarantee a higher probability of being correct. As Bulmer (1979,
p. 416) shows, if one is allowed to toss the coin twice, then the probability of being correct
increases to 9
14
.
In what follows, I will show that the optimin criterion coincides with Wald’s maximin
criterion (with a pessimist Nature) and von Neumann’s (1928) maximin strategies in zero-
sum games. The following theorem shows that a strategy profile is an optimin point if
and only if it is a pair of maximin strategies in zero-sum games.
Theorem 5. Let S be a statistical game. A profile py˚1 , y
˚
2 q P Y1 ˆ Y2 is an optimin point
if and only if y˚1 P argmaxy1 infy2 u1py1, y2q and y
˚
2 P argmaxy2 infy1 u2py1, y2q.
Proof. ‘ñ’ First, we show that vipyi, yjq “ infy1jPYj uipyi, y
1
jq for each i ‰ j. Suppose that
there exists y¯j P Yj such that y¯j P argminy1jPYj uipyi, y
1
jq. Then, we have that vipyi, yjq “
miny1jPYj uipyi, y
1
jq “ uipyi, y¯jq. Suppose, otherwise, that for all y
1
j P Yj there exists y
2
j P Yj
such that uipyi, y
2
j q ă uipyi, y
1
jq. This implies that
vipyi, yjq “ inf
y1j :uipyi,y
1
jqăuipyi,yjq
uipyi, y
1
jq “ inf
y1jPYj
uipyi, y
1
jq.
Next, we show that the value of an optimin point py˚1 , y
˚
2 q must be Pareto dominant in
a zero-sum game. By contraposition, suppose that its value is not Pareto dominant, that
is, there is another optimin point pyˆ1, yˆ2q such that vipy
˚
1 , y
˚
2 q ą vipyˆ1, yˆ2q and vjpy
˚
1 , y
˚
2 q ă
vjpyˆ1, yˆ2q for i ‰ j. Then, we have v1py
˚
1 , y
˚
2 q “ v1py
˚
1 , yˆ2q and v2pyˆ1, yˆ2q “ v2py
˚
1 , yˆ2q. This
implies the value of py˚i , yˆjq Pareto dominates the value of py
˚
1 , y
˚
2 q, which is a contradiction
to our supposition that py˚1 , y
˚
2 q is an optimin point. Since the value of py
˚
1 , y
˚
2 q is Pareto
dominant, each strategy is a maximin strategy of the respective players.
‘ð’ Suppose that for each i we have y˚i P argmaxyi infyj uipyi, yjq. This implies that for
all py11, y
1
2q P Y1 ˆ Y2 and for each i we have vipy
˚
1 , y
˚
2 q ě vipy
1
1, y
1
2q. Hence the value of
py˚1 , y
˚
2 q is Pareto dominant, which implies that it is an optimin point.
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5 Conclusions
The maximin criterion has far-reaching applications in statistics, politics, philosophy, op-
erations research, and engineering, as well as economics. In this paper, I have proposed
a novel concept, dubbed the optimin criterion, which (i) addresses criticisms of the max-
imin criterion, (ii) extends the maximin criterion to n-person non-zero-sum games, and
(iii) is equivalent to the core in cooperative games whenever core exists. Finally, the
maximin criterion is consistent with well-established non-Nash experimental deviations
towards cooperation in noncooperative games.
In addition to games, natural research directions for the optimin criterion are the
ones in which the maximin criterion has been extensively applied. These include the
study of ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty (see, e.g., Wakker, 2010), fair division (see,
e.g., Brams and Taylor, 1996), and other aforementioned fields. For example, it is natu-
ral to ask what axioms would rationalize the optimin criterion under various frameworks
including games and decisions. When I consider the reduced-normal form of an extensive-
form game, optimin point solutions seem to have forward induction reasoning rather than
backward induction reasoning except in (strictly) competitive games. Therefore, extend-
ing the definition of the optimin criterion to extensive-form games is another research
direction opened up by this paper. This direction would lead to the exploration of the
optimin criterion’s relationship to forward and backward induction reasoning. Finally,
under reasonable conditions, optimin criterion coincides with Wald’s maximin criterion
and the maxmin expected utility. In more general strategic and nonstrategic contexts,
the optimin criterion is yet to be axiomatized.
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